Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) used on image classification tasks such as ImageNet have been shown to be biased towards recognizing textures rather than shapes. Recent work has attempted to alleviate this by augmenting the training dataset with shape-based examples to create Stylized-ImageNet. However, in this paper we show that models trained on this dataset remain vulnerable to Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs). We use UAPs to evaluate and compare the robustness of CNN models with varying degrees of shape-based training. We also find that a posteriori fine-tuning on ImageNet negates features learned from training on Stylized-ImageNet. This study reveals an important limitation and reiterates the need for further research into understanding the robustness of CNNs for visual recognition.
Introduction
Advances in computation and machine learning have enabled deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to become prominent algorithms for various computer visions tasks such as image recognition [14] , object detection, and semantic segmentation [15] . However, despite their success, CNNs remain vulnerable to adversarial examples: inputs that appear similar to genuine images but are designed to fool the models [2, 26] .
Adversarial examples pose a great security risk and undermine the adoption of CNNs. Defending against adversarial examples remains a challenging task as the adversarial perturbations required to fool the learning algorithm can be imperceptible and can easily be changed to adapt against various defences [1, 4] . Understanding how CNNs arrive to their outputs could help explain model decisions and make them more robust against adversarial perturbations.
There have been two general hypotheses on how computer vision CNNs reach their output decisions [7] . First is the shape hypothesis, where the intuition is that CNNs aggregate low-level features such as curves and edges to recognize global object shapes. Second is the texture hypothesis, which suggests that image textures are more important than object shapes in determining the output. Recent evidence suggests that it is sufficient for models to use image textures to achieve high accuracy on the ImageNet [23] image classification task [3, 7] . To make models more robust, Geirhos et al. [7] proposed Stylized-ImageNet, a modified ImageNet dataset that requires recognizing object shapes rather than textures to discriminate images in the dataset.
As adversarial perturbations appear to visibly alter textures rather than object shapes in images, it is reasonable to assume that models trained on the Stylized-ImageNet dataset will be more robust to adversarial examples. In fact, Orhan & Lake [20] show that features from models trained on Stylized-ImageNet provide improved robustness against adversarial perturbations when combined with an episodic memory mechanism.
Despite these claims of robustness, our findings show that CNNs trained on Stylized-ImageNet remain as vulnerable to adversarial examples as those trained on ImageNet. In particular, we show the models' fragility against Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs), perturbations that can fool the model across a large number of inputs [16] . We choose UAPs over input-specific adversarial perturbations as the former represent patterns that are systemic vulnerabilities to these CNNs. We find that fine-tuning on ImageNet to improve accuracy on the ImageNet task also appears to overwrite features learned from training on Stylized-ImageNet. To understand this behaviour, we further identify which layers of these models are more susceptible to UAPs. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We demonstrate that models trained on StylizedImageNet are as vulnerable to UAPs as models trained on ImageNet. However, the degree of training on each dataset changes which sets of UAP features the model is more vulnerable to. Figure 1 . Examples of UAPs generated from (top) the different ResNet-50 [9] models and (bottom) VGG [25] and DenseNet [10] models. For the top row, the titles for each indicate how the model was trained, complete details for these are in Section 3.
2. We find that subsequent fine-tuning on ImageNet appears to overwrite previous features learned from training on Stylized-ImageNet. This highlights the need for more careful evaluation of the models' robustness when training on different data distributions.
3. We show that untargeted UAP attacks cause models to predominantly classify perturbed images as certain types of class labels. These dominant class labels are consistent with the visual appearance of the UAPs. 4 . We observe that model architectures with more layers and fewer parameters appear to be more robust to UAP transfer attacks. Additionally, the ResNet-50 model that was trained on both Stylized-ImageNet and ImageNet without fine-tuning had UAPs that transferred better to the other model architectures.
5. We show how evaluating layer-targeted UAPs can be used to gain a better understanding of a model's robustness and identify which features are vulnerable depending on the layer it was generated from.
These contributions have important implications on our understanding how neural networks behave, and our findings suggest that further research into how to achieve neural network robustness in the context of visual recognition is badly needed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces UAPs and algorithms for generating UAPs. Section 3 outlines the experiment details, including the dataset, models, attacks, and evaluation metrics used. Sections 4 through 6 go over the experimental results and discussions for the UAP attacks. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our findings and suggests future research directions.
Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Adversarial perturbations are universal when the same noise pattern can be successfully applied across a large fraction of the input data to fool a model [16] . These UAPs are more interesting than input-specific ones as they reveal systemic vulnerabilities that models are sensitive to regardless of the input [5, 11] .
UAPs are also transferable across models [5, 16] i.e., a UAP generated from one model can be applied as a UAP to different models trained on the same task [21] . This transferability property can be exploited in transfer attacks where UAPs for one model are used to attack other models that the attacker does not have direct access to [22] . UAPs are more likely to transfer effectively between models that learn and are therefore vulnerable to similar features.
To measure the effectiveness of UAPs, we define the universal evasion rate of a perturbation over the dataset. Given model output f , input x ∈ X, perturbation s, and a small ε > 0, the universal evasion rate of s over X is:
where τ (x) is the true class label of x. An ∞ -norm constraint on s, often used in the literature, ensures that the perturbation is small and does not greatly alter the visual appearance of the resulting image.
We primarily use two algorithms for generating UAPs in this work. The first method introduced by Shafahi et al. [24] is for efficiently generating effective UAPs in a white-box setting. The second method is a new attack that we introduce to generate white-box UAPs that target specific layers of the model. Although, in theory, this second method would generate less effective UAPs than the first, it will reveal more information on which layers of the model correspond to the features that create more effective or more transferable UAPs.
Stochastic Gradient Descent Attack
For generating UAPs, we use the batch Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) algorithm proposed by Shafahi et al. [24] as its UAPs have higher universal evasion rates than those of other methods. Furthermore, it is a more efficient algorithm with better convergence guarantees than iterativeDeepFool (iDeepFool), the original UAP generation algorithm proposed in [16] . The goal of SGD is to maximize the loss function
where
is a training batch of images and l is the loss used for training the CNN. The perturbation is updated via SGD, and these updates are then projected to the ∞ -norm ball. We refer the reader to [24] for complete details and its full implementation.
Layer-Targeted Attack
Other UAP generation methods are designed to target layers of the model, be more independent of the training data, or use less computation power [5, 6, 13, 17] . However, when these are compared to iDeepFool and SGD, the resulting UAPs achieve lower universal evasion rates under the same perturbation constraints [24] .
We introduce the SGD-Layer attack where we replace the loss function used for training the CNN, l in equation 2, with a new objective function to maximize
where f k (x) is the activation vector in the k-th layer given input x. The 2 -norm on the activation vector is to quantify its magnitude. The goal of this attack is to find a UAP s that saturates the layer for as many input x i . This would disrupt classification and lead to incorrect model outputs.
By measuring the universal evasion rate and transferability of UAPs generated from this SGD-Layer attack, we can better interpret and understand which layers correspond to the more vulnerable features of the model.
Experiment Setup
In this section, we outline the primary experiment details including the datasets, models, and perturbations used. We generate UAPs for the ImageNet task and evaluate their effectiveness on the ResNet-50 models to study how different training methodologies affect the models' robustness.
Dataset & Models
The ILSVRC2012 ImageNet classification task [23] , or ImageNet for short, is a widely used computer vision benchmark with 1,000 distinct object categories where each image is assigned one ground truth label. Existing work has shown that ImageNet it is sufficient to perform well on ImageNet based on texture-based information [3, 7] . Geirhos et al. created a more shape-based dataset in StylizedImageNet, which replaces textures of ImageNet images while retaining the global shape of the original object. The idea is to create a dataset that requires a model to use global shapes rather than image textures to identify and discriminate objects. Stylized-ImageNet is generated by applying style transfer of different uninformative textures onto ImageNet images. The complete details of its generation are described in [7] .
Models. We use the ResNet-50 [9] architecture for CNNs that takes as input images with dimensions 224 × 224 × 3. We have tested the following ResNet-50 models, named according to the training dataset used: IN (only ImageNet), SIN (only Stylized-ImageNet), SIN+IN (both Stylized-ImageNet and ImageNet), and SIN+2IN (both Stylized-ImageNet and ImageNet, and then fine-tuned on ImageNet). Complete details for each are given in [7] . From here onwards, we use IN and SIN to refer to the models rather than the datasets. SIN+2IN was also referred to as "Shape-ResNet" and was one of the models highlighted by Geirhos et al due to its accuracy. Table 1 shows the performance of these models on the ImageNet validation set, which consists of 50,000 images. SIN achieves a reasonable accuracy despite not being trained directly on ImageNet. The fine-tuning done on SIN+IN to get SIN+2IN resulted in an incremental 2.13% improvement in the clean error rate. 
Perturbations
To evaluate the robustness of the models against UAPs, we measure their universal evasion rates against SGD and SGD-Layer attacks. We generate and optimize the SGDbased perturbations on each model for various ∞ -norms (2 ≤ ε ≤ 12) over the entire 50,000 image ImageNet validation set. The UAP literature often focuses on ε = 10, so we use this as our primary benchmark, but we also provide results for other values to measure its effectiveness with different perturbation constraints. For each UAP, we evaluate its universal evasion rate on the model it was generated from (white-box attack) and on the three remaining models (transfer attack) over the entire validation set. For SGDLayer, we focus on targeting ReLU layers as the outputs of those layers do not have a trivial upper bound.
Metrics. Aside from the universal evasion rate described in equation 2, we also define a normalized Universal Evasion Rate (nUER) for a perturbation s over dataset X. Since we are comparing the effectiveness of UAPs on different models with different clean dataset error rates, it is useful to normalize the universal evasion rates in terms of their clean dataset error.
This is defined so that 100% nUER means that the perturbation achieves 100% universal evasion rate, and 0% nUER means that the perturbation does not change the error rate from the clean dataset.
Robustness of Stylized-ImageNet Training
In this section, we discuss the primary results where we compare the different ResNet-50 models by measuring the effectiveness and transferability of UAPs generated from the SGD attack. UAPs, which can be thought of as subtle changes to the image texture, should be far less effective on shape-biased models, like those trained on StylizedImageNet, than on models trained on ImageNet especially for small perturbation values ε. However, our results show that models trained on Stylized-ImageNet are still as vulnerable to white-box UAPs as models trained on ImageNet.
Vulnerability to Different Features
White-box attacks, where the UAP is generated from the tested model, achieve high success rates. They consistently reach greater than 90% evasion rate for ε ≥ 10 on all models as shown in Figure 2 . For transfer attacks, where the UAP is generated from a model different from the evaluated one, the universal evasion rate consistently rises for ε > 4.
Despite having the highest error on the clean dataset, SIN appears to be the most resilient to transfer attacks relative to its clean dataset accuracy. The ImageNet training on IN, SIN+IN, and SIN+2IN appears to have decreased their UAPs' effectiveness against SIN. This is most evident when measuring the normalized Universal Evasion Rates (nUER). When considering the normalized evasion rate, the nUER of the UAP from SIN against IN and SIN+2IN is above 40% for ε ≥ 10, yet UAPs from IN and SIN+2IN against SIN barely passes 20% nUER for ε ≥ 10. This shows the merits of exclusively training on Stylized-ImageNet, as the shapebias in the dataset appears to make it more resilient against transfer attacks. This robustness may come at the cost of a high clean dataset error as SIN+IN, relative to SIN, has better clean dataset accuracy.
That white-box UAPs are still effective against SIN shows that Stylized-ImageNet training does not greatly diminish the effects of UAPs. Instead, Stylized-ImageNet training may have made the model more vulnerable to a different set of features than those that ImageNet-trained models are vulnerable to. Hence, the features that models are most vulnerable to appear to depend more on the data distribution of its training dataset. It is however interesting to note in Figure 2 that UAPs from IN and SIN+2IN have near-identical effectiveness against SIN. One might instead have expected the UAP from SIN+2IN to be between IN and SIN+IN in terms of effectiveness against SIN.
SIN+IN incorporates training on both datasets to a similar degree, so the moderate transferability of UAPs to and from it against all the other models supports the claim that UAPs generated from SIN+IN exploit features that are learned from both ImageNet and Stylized-ImageNet datasets. Interestingly, in Figure 2 , UAPs from the three other models IN, SIN, and SIN+2IN have very similar universal evasion rates against SIN+IN, even when IN and SIN are datasets with different distributions. This suggests that the most effective UAPs against SIN+IN would have to combine adversarial features learned from both ImageNet and Stylized-ImageNet. Although we would have expected UAPs from SIN+2IN to have higher effectiveness than those from IN or SIN, this is not the case. Given that training on different dataset distributions makes the model vulnerable to different sets of features, the near identical performance of transfer attacks to and from IN and SIN+2IN is surprising.
Impact of Fine-tuning on Robustness
Although SIN+2IN achieves the best clean dataset accuracy and appears to make more shape-based decisions according to psychophysical trials in [7] , our results show that its response to UAPs is very similar to that of the model trained only on ImageNet (IN). Figure 1 shows large visual similarities between UAPs generated from SIN+2IN and IN, while the UAP from SIN+IN appears to blend visual elements of UAPs from IN and SIN. In Figure 2 , we see that UAPs generated from IN and SIN+2IN have similar transferability against both SIN and SIN+IN. Additionally, in Figure 3 , we see that UAPs transferred to IN and SIN+2IN have very similar universal evasion rates, especially for UAPs generated from SIN and SIN+IN.
These results suggest that there are large similarities in the features that SIN+2IN and IN are vulnerable to despite SIN+2IN being trained on Stylized-ImageNet. This phenomenon may have been caused by the fine-tuning, as SIN+2IN is a fine-tuned version of SIN+IN. Although the fine-tuning decreased the model's clean dataset error by 2.13% when compared to SIN+IN, this resulted in a 20% increase in error against UAPs from IN and SIN+IN. It appears that chasing the last few percentage points of accuracy could come at the cost of drastically reduced robustness against the type of UAPs that are effective against models trained only on ImageNet.
The additional fine-tuning on ImageNet could have resulted in the model "overfitting" where it no longer uses the general features it has learned from training on both datasets, and instead just focuses on the features learned when training on ImageNet. This shows that training and fine-tuning on different data distributions may have unintended effects on the robustness and the vulnerabilities of the models.
Implications on Adversarial Training & Transfer Learning. This result for fine-tuning models could explain why adversarial training against multiple perturbations becomes untenable. Adversarial training is a procedure where adversarial examples are inserted into the training set to make the model more robust against a specific attack [8] . Existing work [12, 27] has shown that adversarial training on one perturbation sacrifices robustness against others, so it is difficult to gain robustness against multiple perturbations as the later training epochs could overwrite training from earlier epochs.
In the context of transfer learning, the early layers of a model trained on one task, such as image classification, are reused as feature extractors for another model on a similar but different task, such as object localization. The model as a whole is then fine-tuned for the loss function of the new task [28] . Hidden layers from models pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset are often re-used for other natural-image classification tasks [19] . This makes transferred layers a notable target, as vulnerabilities that exploit these layers carry over to the new models. Precisely characterizing the degree of fine-tuning and its effect on the robustness of the model is an interesting direction for future work.
Label Analysis
The ImageNet task has 1,000 classes and a 50,000 image validation set. On the clean dataset, the distribution of resulting output labels from all models is uniform, with less than 1% for each of the 1,000 class labels. However, when the dataset is perturbed with a UAP from our SGD attack, it makes models classify towards specific output labels despite SGD not being a label-targeted attack by design.
In Figure 4 , we see that each white-box UAP has at least 2-3 dominant output labels, each comprising 10-36% of the predictions on the perturbed dataset. For example, when IN is attacked with the UAP generated from IN, the three most common output labels are: brain coral (36.1%), coral reef (18.7%), and maze (11.0%).
UAPs from IN and SIN+2IN barely have an effect on SIN as the classified labels appear to be evenly distributed, although brain coral still is the most frequently occurring output label. UAPs from SIN do not have as great an effect on IN or SIN+2IN, but we see that the labels quilt, mosque, dome are still favoured at about 4% each. The UAP from SIN+IN appears to have a decent effect against all models, heavily favouring labels with curtains.
We notice the following trends for each of the models: UAPs generated from IN and SIN+2IN appear to favour more texture-based objects, most notably brain coral and coral reef. The vulnerability towards the brain coral and coral reef classes of ImageNet-trained models was also shown by procedural noise UAPs in a previous study [5] .
UAPs generated from SIN favour structures and buildings. This may be because SIN is more reliant on making decisions based on shapes, so it is more susceptible to misclassifying objects towards labels that have more distinctive shapes. Often the shape of buildings in the dataset are clear due to the sky being a backdrop in these images. Just as IN and SIN+2IN are vulnerable to brain coral, maze, and peacock due to the distinctive textures of these labels, SIN is vulnerable to buildings which are objects with distinct shapes. UAPs generated from SIN+IN favour curtains. We hypothesize that curtains are an intermediate class that blend shape and texture to an similar degree.
These observations on the favoured output labels for each model are consistent with the resulting UAP patterns seen in Figure 1 . There is a striking visual resemblance between the perturbations and the favoured output labels. Additionally, these results also align with our findings from Section 4.1 that training on different datasets makes models more vulnerable to different sets of features. In this case, the models' vulnerable features manifest as the characteristic features of the favoured output class labels.
Robustness Across Architectures
The results up to this point have only been obtained on the ResNet-50 architecture. To gain a better understanding of the robustness and effects of Stylized-ImageNet training, we also conduct a preliminary evaluation on three other models with different architectures trained on ImageNet: DenseNet-121 [10] , VGG-16, and VGG-19 [25] . We refer to these models as D121, V16, and V19 respectively. Like ResNet-50, these models take input images of dimension 224 × 224 × 3 and have similar clean dataset accuracies.
Compared to ResNet-50, the VGG models have fewer layers, whilst the DenseNet model has more layers and uses dense blocks. The architectures have approximately 8 million, 25 million, and 140 million parameters for DenseNet, ResNet-50, and VGG respectively. We are particularly interested in comparing the universal evasion rates of UAPs to and from D121 and V19 with those obtained with SIN and
Transferability to Other Models
In Figure 5 , the VGG models are noticeably more vulnerable to all UAPs, whereas D121 is relatively more resilient to the UAPs from the other models. The UAPs generated from V16 and V19 are not particularly effective against the other models, while those from D121 have moderate transferability. When focusing on just the ImageNet-trained models (IN, V16, V19, D121) , the different degrees of robustness could be attributed to the different characteristics of the model architectures. From these results, we see that the deeper architectures with fewer parameters appear to be more robust. Compared to IN, SIN does not improve on the transferability of UAPs to the newly added models and SIN+2IN does not make a huge difference either. However, the UAP from SIN+IN has noticeably higher transferability against all models, achieving at least 70% universal evasion rate against each model. We hypothesize that SIN+IN has learned more generalized representations because it was trained equally on both ImageNet and Stylized-ImageNet without overfitting to either. Thus, UAPs generated from SIN+IN exploit more general features that allow them to better transfer to other models on the ImageNet task.
Label Analysis
For the resulting output labels caused by the UAPs, the dominant labels from white-box UAPs for V16, V19, and D121 are still brain coral and coral reef, each comprising 20-30% of the output labels. The vulnerability to the same texture-based class labels appears to be an effect of training on the ImageNet dataset. However, the different architectures most likely result in different "interpretations" of these labels. This could explain the slightly differing visual appearances in their UAP patterns as seen in Figure 1 . The UAP generated by SIN+IN still causes misclassification towards the curtain class labels for V16, V19, and D121 in a similar way that it did against IN. We include figures for these label analysis results in the supplementary material.
These results show that models with more depth and fewer parameters may be more robust to UAPs. Additionally, the Stylized-ImageNet training to create SIN+IN has made the model's UAP more transferable. This shows that the Stylized-ImageNet training without fine-tuning may have resulted in a model that has learned more general features, enabling it to have more effective UAPs for attacking other architectures. In future work, we aim to evaluate how model architecture and training methods affect the robustness and transferability of UAPs.
Maximizing Layer Activations
In this section, we discuss the results and implications of the SGD-Layer attack against the ResNet-50 models for ε = 10. We focus on targeting the final ReLU layers of each block, of which ResNet-50 has 17. This study allows us to better interpret and understand which layers correspond to the more vulnerable features of the model. Feature visualization has been previously done on deep convolutional networks, where the activation of specific neurons is maximized to generate patterns that represent what would trigger a targeted group of neurons [18] . Olah et al. have found that early layers correspond to simple features, such as edges and curves, while the later layers correspond to more complex patterns in shapes and objects. This helps to better interpret the results from the SGD-Layer attack. For example, if UAPs from the first layers are more effective than those from the last layers, then this means that the model is more sensitive to images filled with simple edges and textures rather than complex shapes.
Like in Section 4, IN and SIN+2IN share similar universal evasion rates and UAPs from both these models are ineffective against SIN. In Figure 6 , the UAPs generated from the first four ReLU layers are relatively ineffective. In  IN, SIN+2IN , and SIN+IN, the UAPs become significantly more effective from the 5th layer onwards, whereas on SIN it starts from the 8th layer. This shows that SIN appears to be more robust to simpler textures than the other models. After the 8th layer, white-box UAPs on SIN remain at or above 80% universal evasion, which shows that SIN is noticeably vulnerable to more complex shapes. These findings align with SIN being trained only on a shape-based dataset while all the other models were trained on the texture-based ImageNet.
For the layers between 11 and 15, there is a noticeable drop in effectiveness for UAPs from IN and SIN+2IN against all the models. On the other hand, the UAP from SIN+IN dips only slightly and the UAP from SIN becomes more effective. It may be that texture-based attacks mani- fest in the earlier layers, whereas later layers correspond to patters more biased towards object shapes. This appears to indicate that the models trained on ImageNet are less vulnerable to patterns that indicate shape-based labels, whereas training solely on Stylized-ImageNet makes it more vulnerable to these patterns from layers 12 to 14.
We find that targeting the middle to later layers with SGD-Layer creates more effective UAPs. This is at odds with the result from Khrulkov & Oseledets [13] who found that targeting earlier layers with their singular vector method resulted in more effective UAPs. This may be because their method approximates the layer's output with the Jacobian with respect to the input. The Jacobian is a less accurate approximation for the later layers, which would impact the effectiveness of their attack. In contrast, SGDLayer utilizes the exact output of the targeted layer.
Overall, we see how measuring the effectiveness of UAPs from SGD-Layer helps us gain insight into the features that models learn. Such analysis with UAPs could also be an interesting tool to study model behavior and to inform the design of new architectures.
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate how UAPs can be used to better understand and evaluate the robustness of CNN models with differing degrees of shape-based and texture-based training. We show with white-box UAPs how training on Stylized-ImageNet still leaves models vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations. Additionally, we found that finetuning on ImageNet appears to overwrite features learned from training on Stylized-ImageNet. This highlights the need for more careful evaluation of model robustness when fine-tuning models.
We also found that generated UAPs favour classification towards specific class labels, and these dominant class labels appear to align with the visual appearance of the UAPs. This observation, along with evaluations of layer-targeted UAPs, reveal image characteristics and features that these particular models are more vulnerable to. Our findings give insight into how the choice of training datasets and model architectures affect the visual appearance of UAPs and the resulting robustness of the models. We hope future research directions explore ways to mitigate the sensitivity of models to UAPs to achieve a better understanding of how training on different data distributions affects model robustness.
